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I
ndependent Ukraine has faced a momentous 
conundrum in dealing with Orthodox believers and 
churches and their aspirations and demands on 
political authorities. The Ukrainian government has 
pursued varied policies towards a changing structure of 
Orthodox bodies. Although independent Ukraine was far 
from a fully functioning democracy or even on a 
consistent democratizing trajectory before the Orange 
Revolution, the new state has certainly been far removed 
from the Soviet totalitarian model from which it emerged. 
This paper will explore how political transformation has 
affected the Orthodox in Ukraine, above all the structures 
of their churches, and how the Orthodox and their 
churches have influenced Ukrainian democracy and 
political life.
The 14,954 Orthodox communities in Ukraine on
January 1, 2004, made up a majority (52.2 percent) of all 
religious communities in the country.1 In declarations of 
religious adherence Orthodoxy commanded an imposing 
percentage of Ukraine's population. In this land where a 
considerable group had no religious allegiance, 
approximately 40 to 50 percent of the population 
considered itself Orthodox in the 1990s.2 Polling in recent 
years reveals that 27.8 percent of the population considers 
itself members of one of the Orthodox churches, and an 
additional 53.2 percent as “Orthodox,” though the latter 
figure includes a considerable number of “culturally
1 See the press release of the Religious Information Service of Ukraine 
of April 16, 2004, and its table of "Religious Organizations in Ukraine as 
of 1 January, 2004," taken here from the newspaper of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church of Canada, The Herald (Winnipeg) June 1/15, 2004.
Statistics for 2004 are from this source.
2 See the Sotsis-Gallup poll of February 1998, published in Den' on 
February 26, 1998, cited in Andrew Wilson, The Ukrainians: Unexpected 
Nation (New Haven-London, 2000), 349, fn. 9, with 45.7 percent
answering Orthodox in some form.
Orthodox” atheists and agnostics.3 Therefore, although 
Ukraine has much greater religious pluralism than other 
traditionally Orthodox countries such as Georgia, Greece, 
or Serbia, in part because of its large Catholic and 
Protestant populations, Orthodoxy constitutes a major 
presence in the country and its self-image. At the same 
time, with 47 million people, Ukraine is the second largest 
traditionally Orthodox country and, although its 
population is only about a third of Russia's, Ukraine has a 
larger number of Orthodox communities than does its 
northern neighbor.4
The importance of Orthodoxy within Ukraine and of 
Ukraine for the Orthodox world explains why the division 
of Ukraine's believers into three Orthodox churches has 
had such far-reaching reverberations. In early 2004, 
10,384 (9049 in 2001) of the Orthodox communities were 
part of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC-MP), a 
body having some elements of autonomy under the 
Moscow Patriarchate.5 The UOC-MP held the allegiance 
of 69.4 percent of all Orthodox communities, a slight, but 
steady decline in percentage from 72.2 percent in 1995 
and 70.4 percent in 2001. The Moscow Patriarchate, 
therefore, had almost as many religious communities in 
Ukraine as in Russia, since the entire patriarchate lists 
23,000 parishes in Russia, Ukraine, and all other former
3 See Iuryi Chernomorets, “Sotsial'naia baza ukrainskogo
pravoslaviia”http://www.risu.ua/ukr/religion.and.society/chernomorec
-sozbaza/p.2.
4 A December 2, 2002, article in the newspaper Den' asserted that there 
were then 11,000 Orthodox parishes in Russia and 15,000 in Ukraine, of 
which more than 10,000 were part of the Moscow Patriarchate
(www.day.kiev.ua). This proportion appears in line with the statistics for 
2004 mentioned below.
5 Statistics on religious communities in Ukraine, other than those for 
2004, unless otherwise indicated come from the tables compiled by A. 
Zaiarniuk and Y. Komar. I am grateful to Rev. Dr. Borys Gudziak for 
providing me with copies.
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Soviet republics.6 Alongside the UOC-MP communities in 
2004, there were 3395 communities of the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP), 
constituting 22.7 percent of all Orthodox communities. 
The Kyiv Patriarchate was the most rapidly growing 
Orthodox Church, having increased its parish 
communities from 2,781 in 2001, or by 22.1 percent as 
opposed to a 14.8 percent increase for the Moscow 
Patriarchate.7 In contrast, the 1,156 communities of the 
Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), 7.7 
percent of the total, had grown a more modest 13.9 
percent from 1015 communities in 2001. The breakdown 
in religious communities is at variance with polls of the 
population that have consistently shown supporters of the 
Moscow Patriarchate to be supported by a smaller 
percentage of believers than its percentage of religious 
communities would indicate and frequently shown the 
Kyiv Patriarchate to have a larger number of supporters.8
6 "Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' na sovremennom etape," on 
www.mospat.ru/text/history/id/10.html.
7 On the rapid growth of the Kyiv Patriarchate, especially in southern 
and eastern Ukraine, see "Interview with Patriarch Filaret (Denysenko)," 
conducted on November 16, 2003, and disseminated by the Religious
Information Service of Ukraine
(www.risu.org.ua/content.php?page_id=162&l=en).
8 See the statistics on the Sotsis-Gallup poll mentioned in note 2, 
revealing for the total population 20.4 percent UOC-KP, 7.5 percent 
UOC-MP and 1.8 percent UAOC, though with 16 percent just answering 
Orthodox. A 1997 comprehensive survey discussed by Wilson (pp. 236-
37) found that of the 65.7 percent of the population that considered 
themselves believers, 23.9 percent supported the Moscow Patriarchate, 43 
percent the Kyiv Patriarchate, and 4 percent the UAOC. A poll conducted 
by the Ukrainian Sociology Service on November 5-21, 2003, for the 
Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church revealed that of the 27.8 percent of the 
population that professed allegiance to a specific Orthodox church, 15.4 
percent adhered to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow 
Patriarchate, 11.7 percent to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv 
Patriarchate, and 0.7 percent to the UAOC. The religious allegiance of the 
larger group that was simply Orthodox was very amorphous.
Chornomorets, “Sotsial'naia baza,” pp. 2-3. Possible reasons for the
discrepancy of the polls and the number of communities may include that 
the polls include the large number of non-practicing Orthodox who may 
lean toward the Kyiv Patriarchate, that Kyiv Patriarchate churches may 
have larger constituencies, that the disposition of the churches may reflect 
the clergy's preference and not the laity's, or that local authorities may 
have preferred the Moscow patriarchate in assigning church buildings and 
registering communities in many areas of Ukraine.
The distribution of religious communities in Ukraine 
in general, including Orthodox churches, is subject to 
great regional differentiation. The western areas annexed 
by the Soviet Union only during and after World War II 
have the highest per capita percentage of religious 
communities and religious practice. The industrial regions 
of southeast Ukraine have the lowest, as they did in Soviet 
times, although the difference is diminishing. Thus while 
in 1989 Lviv oblast in the west had approximately the 
same number of inhabitants as Luhansk oblast in the 
southeast (2,727,000 to 2,864,000), in 1992 Lviv oblast 
had 2,206 religious communities, or 13 times as many as 
Luhansk oblast's 166.9 In 2000 the discrepancy was still 
2,541 to 463, or 5.5 times greater. In general, the 
predominantly Ukrainian-speaking regions of west and 
central Ukraine have a much higher rate of religious 
practice and a disproportionate share of Orthodox 
communities for all three Orthodox churches. Even the 
Moscow Patriarchate has the majority of its parishes in 
central and western Ukraine, despite the wave of church 
openings in southern and eastern Ukraine in the late 
1990s.10
The Soviet Legacy
The relationship between Orthodoxy and the 
independent Ukrainian state unfolded out of the legacy of 
Soviet religious policy. That policy prescribed 
persecution of all religious life, including its virtual 
decimation in the 1930s, forced secularization of the 
population, and manipulation and infiltration of those 
religious institutions allowed by the Soviet government. 
With the wartime decision to permit the restoration of the 
patriarchate in the Russian Orthodox church in 1943 and 
the postwar return to Soviet control of Ukraine and 
Belarus, where the Germans had permitted churches that 
had been closed by the Soviets to be re-opened, and the
9 Oblast populations are taken from the Encyclopedia of Ukraine, vol. 3 
(Toronto-Buffalo-London, 1993), 201, 234.
10 In 2000 it had 2,045 parishes in western Ukrainian oblasts (chiefly in 
Chernivtsi, Transcarpathia, Volyn and Rivne oblasts, with a few in the 
three Galician oblasts) and 1948 in the three Right Bank oblasts of
Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr and Khmel'nyts'kyi). Adding the communities on
the Right Bank of Cherkasy and Kyiv oblasts gives it a clear majority
with its 8490 communities. Given the higher percentage of religious
belief and practice in these regions, the parishes there were likely to be
more numerous and vibrant.
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annexation of western Ukraine and Belarus, the Russian 
Orthodox Church (ROC) was given a monopoly of control 
over Eastern Christians. The Ukrainian Autocephalous 
Orthodox Church, founded in 1921, destroyed during the 
1930s, and revived in German-occupied territories during 
World War II, was banned.11 The Uniate or Ukrainian 
Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) was forcibly dissolved 
through a sham council in 1946 at which no bishops 
agreed to attend, and its parishes were turned over to the 
Russian Orthodox Church. Thus the Soviet state 
completed the Russian Imperial government's policy of 
stamping out the Uniate church in lands that it annexed, 
though at that time the Russian Orthodox Church bore 
more of the responsibility than it did in the Soviet 
period.12 The Soviet government controlled all religious 
edifices and required registration of church communities. 
The entire Soviet legacy was one of weakened religious 
structures, an inequity in its treatment of churches by 
favoring the Moscow Patriarchate, and a government 
accustomed to controlling the disposition and actions of 
religious institutions.
The Soviet government also pursued a policy of 
treating the formerly Uniate areas of Galicia and 
Transcarpathia differently than all the other regions of 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. Throughout the postwar 
period, even after the church closings in western Ukraine 
in the 1960s, almost one-quarter of all the functioning 
parishes of the Moscow Patriarchate in the entire Soviet 
Union were to be found in formerly predominantly Uniate 
areas (and over half were in Ukraine).13 In 1989, of the 
3971 Russian Orthodox communities in Ukraine, 1688 
(42.5 percent) were in the three Galician oblasts. With the 
Transcarpathian oblast, the number reached 2116 (53.3 
percent).14 The Soviet authorities had permitted this
11 On the situation of the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine in this period, 
see my "The Ukrainian Orthodox Question in the USSR," in Serhii 
Plokhy and Frank E. Sysyn, Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine 
(Edmonton and Toronto, 2003), 74-87.
12 On the abolition of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, see 
Bohdan Bociurkiw, The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet 
State (1939-1950) (Edmonton-Toronto, 1996).
13 For statistics on the proportion of churches in western Ukraine, see 
Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "The Orthodox Church and the Soviet Regime in 
Ukraine, 953-1971," Canadian Slavonic Papers, 14, no. 2 (Summer
1972): 193-94 and 196.
14 Adding the other three traditionally Orthodox western Ukrainian 
oblasts, the western Ukrainian total was 2881 or 72.6 percent.
anomaly, in part, because they did not want to drive the 
population into the arms of the underground UGCC, 
which had survived more than forty years of repression.
The disproportionate concentration of the Russian 
Orthodox Church in the traditional Uniate areas explains 
the alarm with which it reacted to the possibility of 
glasnost and perestroika extending religious freedom to 
the Ukrainian Greek Catholics. Quite simply, if the 
Uniates were to reclaim their former faithful and parishes, 
the Russian Orthodox Church in the entire Soviet Union 
would be greatly weakened and its exarchate in Ukraine 
would be near collapse. This situation meant that when the 
reforms initiated in Moscow in the mid-1980s reached 
Ukraine a few years later, the Russian Orthodox Church 
opposed the organization of civic and political groups in 
Ukraine espousing reform but really challenging the 
Soviet totalitarian legacy. These forces that coalesced into 
Rukh (Popular Movement in Support of Perestroika) 
demanded a righting of the wrongs of the Soviet regime, 
including the Soviet destruction of the Ukrainian Greek 
Catholic and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox 
Church. In Galicia, the heartland of the movement, Rukh 
and the newly emerging civil society enjoyed the support 
of the Ukrainian Greek Catholics, who were emerging 
from the underground, and of the large number of 
Galician city dwellers and villagers who saw restoration of 
the church buildings to the Greek Catholics as a central 
point in establishing civil liberties.
Initially the Russian Orthodox Church even benefited 
from the surfacing of the underground Uniates, because 
the Soviet authorities turned over many closed church 
buildings to the Russian Orthodox to keep the still illegal 
Uniates from taking possession of them. That gain was 
temporary. By 1989, with Soviet controls crumbling, the 
Uniates repossessed churches throughout the three oblasts. 
In the summer of 1989 the situation merely worsened for 
the Russian Orthodox as a Ukrainian Autocephalous 
Orthodox Church was resurrected by the declaration of a 
pastor and parish in Lviv. It seems likely that UAOC grew 
so quickly, because clergy who did not want their parishes 
to go Uniate joined it, while its enemies argued that it had 
been inspired by the KGB for the same purpose. In any 
event, the Russian Orthodox Church in Galicia was 
rapidly disintegrating. While the Moscow Patriarchate 
emphasized the role of force in taking over churches, it 
avoided the central issue that the Russian Orthodox 
Church could not compete effectively for the loyalty of a 
Galician population that viewed Russian Orthodoxy as 
imposed by the Soviet regime and associated with Russian 
imperialism. The elections of March 1990 in which the 
Communists were defeated in Galicia meant that the
10
THE HARRIMAN REVIEW
Russian Orthodox Church could no longer depend on the 
civil authorities. From 1989 to 1992 the communities of 
the Moscow Patriarchate in Galicia decreased from 1,688 
to 457, while Ukrainian Catholic communities increased 
to 2,441 and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox to 1,339. 
The majority of these communities were newly founded, 
but others represented Russian Orthodox parishes that 
were matters of dispute between the Ukrainian Catholics 
and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox.15
In contrast to Russia, where the Gorbachev policies of 
liberalization had offered many new opportunities for the 
Russian Orthodox Church, they presented a much more 
mixed bag of losses and opportunities for the church in 
Ukraine. Indeed, the belated legalization of the Ukrainian 
Greek Catholic Church that had so embarrassed the Soviet 
government internationally had been vehemently opposed 
by Volodymr Shcherbyts'kyi's government in Ukraine and 
the exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, because 
they realized what an avalanche it would unleash. The 
reemergence of the UAOC was potentially more 
dangerous as a church that could compete for Orthodox 
believers throughout the country. Like the Ukrainian 
Catholics, the UAOC drew support and a hierarch, 
Metropolitan Mstyslav, from the Ukrainian diaspora. Its 
traditions of martyrdom, conciliarism, autocephaly, and 
Ukrainianization were in keeping with the tone of the 
times and offered a model of Orthodoxy very different 
from that of the Russian Orthodox Church.
The restoration of the UGCC and the UAOC had been 
accomplished even before the declaration of Ukrainian 
sovereignty in July 1990. Consequently, the new 
Ukrainian state had to face an already tense religious 
situation. In the same way, the Orthodox world had to deal 
with the declaration of an autocephalous church in 
Ukraine largely as a movement of clergy and laity 
undertaken even before an independent Ukrainian state 
existed. At the same time, the Russian Orthodox Church 
had found itself greatly weakened and on the side of the 
old Soviet order during an anti-Soviet and Ukrainian 
national groundswell that in the late 1980s and early 
1990s had tremendous impact in western Ukraine, 
including Orthodox Volhynia, Kyiv, and among the 
intelligentsia throughout Ukraine. The national movement 
did not take deep root in the south and east or the central 
Ukrainian villages, which with the loss of Galicia were to
15 On this period, see my "The Third Rebirth of the Ukrainian 
Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Religious Situation in Ukraine 
1989-1991," in Plokhy and Sysyn, Religion and Nation in Modern
Ukraine, 88-119.
be increasingly important to the Russian Orthodox 
Church.
Two types of democratization challenged the Russian 
Orthodox Church. The breakdown of the Soviet political 
monolith had allowed the church's rivals to reemerge in 
western Ukraine and had brought political groups to 
influence and local power that favored its religious 
opponents. At the same time, the rebirth of the UAOC had 
revived modernizing influences that arose in the Russian 
Empire just prior to the Revolution.16 These tendencies 
advocating conciliar governance and greater influence of 
the parish clergy and laity were intrinsic to the UAOC 
tradition, and the church had reemerged through the 
efforts of these groups and the religious brotherhoods. In 
June 1990, when the reform movement in Ukraine was in 
full swing, the UAOC was even able to hold a council in 
Kyiv in a municipal facility and to declare a patriarchate. 
The ROC exarchate's being renamed Ukrainian Orthodox 
in October 1990 and obtaining some measure of 
autonomy largely represented reaction to events rather 
than a thought-out and voluntary policy. The UOC-MP 
did benefit from the new situation in Ukraine in having 
latitude to form new parishes, and its de facto alliance 
with the old Soviet elite in central and eastern Ukraine 
meant that it was handed over church properties, 
especially if newly forming autocephalous communities 
tried to claim them. The hierarchs also took part in the 
electoral process, with Metropolitan Agafangel of 
Vinnytsia (later of Odesa), elected to the Supreme Rada in 
1990, making common cause with the Communists.17 
While the church of the Moscow Patriarchate declined 
from 6,505 communities in January 1990 to 5,031 on 
January 1, 1991, because of its losses in Galicia, it was 
still stronger than it had been in the pre-perestroika period.
The Kravchuk Presidency
The new Ukrainian state that declared its
16 On the UAOC as a modernizing and reform movement, see Bohdan 
Bociurkiw, "The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, 1920-1930: 
A Study in Modernization," in Dennis Dunn, ed., Religion and 
Modernization in the Soviet Union (Boulder, Colo., 1977), 310-47.
17 On Agafangel (Savin)'s role as leader of the Russian nationalist wing 
in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, see Ihor
Isichenko, "Lektsiia 15. Pravoslavna Tserkva v nezalezhnii Ukraini: 
1991-2002," in his book Istoriia Khrystovoi tserkvy v Ukraini: konspekt 
lektsi’i dlia studentiv dukhovnykh shkil, 2d ed. (Kharkiv, 2003).
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independence on August 24, 1991 (and received 
international recognition after a referendum on December 
1, followed by the official dissolution of the Soviet Union) 
emerged in part as the result of the activities of the 
Ukrainian national-democratic movement that had driven 
the political agenda in the republic from 1989. Essential 
for its creation, however, was the shift to a pro-
independence policy on the part of the old Soviet elite and 
nomenklatura. They recognized the strength of Ukrainian 
decentralizing sentiments and sought a way out of the 
chaos after the August coup in Moscow, which resulted in 
declarations of independence for all the Soviet republics 
(except in the Baltic region where declarations had been 
made earlier). The Communist Party secretary for 
ideology, Leonid Kravchuk, from western Ukrainian 
Volhynia, underwent this transformation. He convinced a 
number of Ukraine's old elite to accept their opponents' 
objective of national independence by winning an election 
on December 1 for president over his major opponent, the 
dissident and Rukh leader Viacheslav Chornovil (62 
percent to 23 percent).18
Having embarked on the path of forming a Ukrainian 
state, Kravchuk sought to use his contacts with 
Metropolitan Filaret of Kyiv, exarch of the UOC-MP, to 
give Ukraine the full attributes of statehood, including an 
autocephalous church, and thereby steal the march from 
the UAOC, which, like the UGCC, was associated with 
the national democratic faction.19 Kravchuk overestimated 
the power of Filaret and the new Ukrainian state against 
the entrenched position of the Moscow Patriarchate. 
Although Filaret carried a majority of his bishops in a 
request for autocephaly in November 1991, a Moscow 
synod in April 1992 refused the request, forced his 
resignation, and authorized an episcopal synod in Ukraine 
in May to elect a successor, who was in fact a hierarch 
from Russia (Metropolitan Volodymyr of
Novocherkask).20 Facing the fiasco of the failed attempt to 
secure autocephaly, the Kravchuk government and 
parliamentary deputies from the national democratic 
camp, intent on removing Ukraine's Orthodox from
18 See Wilson, The Ukrainians, 206.
19 See Serhii Plokhy, "Kyiv vs. Moscow: The Autocephalous 
Movement in Independent Ukraine," in Plokhy and Sysyn, Religion and 
Nation in Modern Ukraine, 136-45.
20 See my "The Russian Sobor and the Rejection of Ukrainian
Orthodox Autocephaly," in Plokhy and Sysyn, Religion and Nation in 
Modern Ukraine, 120-27.
Moscow's control, orchestrated a union of the UAOC with 
Metropolitan Filaret, the few bishops and the clergy that 
adhered to him, creating the Ukrainian Orthodox Church- 
Kyiv Patriarchate in June 1992.21 Patriarch Mstyslav of 
the UAOC had not been consulted in the union. He was 
pronounced head of the church, but refused to approve 
fully this union with his former opponent, now deposed by 
the Moscow Patriarchate. Reservations about 
Metropolitan Filaret explain why the new church elected 
the former dissident priest Volodymyr Romaniuk as 
patriarch on Patriarch Mstyslav's death in June 1993 and 
why a sizable faction of the UAOC rejected the union and 
restored their church by electing in September their own 
patriarch, Dmytrii (Yarema). The UAOC also saw the 
UOC-KP as opposed to many of the conciliar elements of 
its program and in favor of the form of governance that 
Metropolitan Filaret and the bishops of the Russian 
Orthodox Church had practised. The UAOC had no 
influence with the Kyiv government, which saw the UOC- 
KP as an incipient state church and favored that church 
over the UOC-MP throughout 1992-93. The Kravchuk 
government had badly calculated the strength of the 
Moscow Patriarchate, above all, to remain the only church 
recognized by the Orthodox world combatting the UOC- 
KP's and the Ukrainian state's requests to the 
Constantinople Patriarchate to recognize the autocephaly. 
It also overestimated its own influence in the Ukrainian 
provinces among local former Soviet elites, especially in 
times of economic decline, fully apparent by 1993.
By the 1994 presidential election, the failure of the 
Kravchuk policy to obtain a single autocephalous church 
for the new state was apparent. The Moscow Patriarchate 
had remained the largest Orthodox Church, even if its 
growth was slow in this period (from 5,473 communities 
on January 1, 1992, to 5,998 on January 1, 1994). The 
Kyiv Patriarchate's 1,932 communities represented a 
considerable church, but it did not rival the Moscow 
Patriarchate's size and already had seen 289 communities 
return to the UAOC and legally register. The Ukrainian 
state faced presidential elections with Orthodox religious 
divides increasingly politicized just at the time that 
language issues and attitudes toward Russia had heated 
up. The campaign of Leonid Kravchuk against Leonid 
Kuchma took on the rhetoric of a decision between those 
who supported full Ukrainian independence, integration 
into Europe, and recognition of Ukrainian as the state
21 See Serhii Plokhy, "Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephaly and 




language versus those who wished for a closer 
relationship (and in some cases integration) with Russia 
and official status for the Russian language. Ukraine 
divided regionally, with Kravchuk, now fully supported 
by his former national democratic political foes, gaining 
94.80 percent of the vote in Ternopil oblast and 93.77 
percent in Lviv oblast in the west and Kuchma obtaining 
89.70 percent in the Crimea and 88.00 percent in Luhansk 
oblast in the east and south. The churches had defined 
political interests in supporting one or the other of the 
candidates, and the loss by Kravchuk (45 percent to 52 
percent) weakened the position of the Kyiv Patriarchate 
and strengthened the position of the Moscow 
Patriarchate.22 How much the churches influenced the 
elections is more difficult to ascertain, with the most likely 
possibility being that of the UOC-MP influencing an 
undecided electorate in the Right Bank Central Ukraine, 
where the relatively dense network of Moscow Patriarchal 
churches may have elevated the Kuchma vote somewhat 
in territories with a rather passive rural electorate. More 
importantly, the various Orthodox churches merely served 
to deepen the chasm among Ukraine's population and 
elections were now essential in deciding the churches' 
situations.
The Kuchma Years
The Kuchma election appeared to represent a full 
victory for the east and south of Ukraine, the Russian-
speaking population, and the Moscow Patriarchate. In 
dealing with regional and linguistic issues, the new 
president soon showed that electioneering was one thing 
but governing was another. In order to carry on his 
programs and to serve the interests of state-building, the 
government turned for support to central and western 
Ukraine and to Ukrainian-speakers, not least because of 
the power of the Communists and the hard line left in the 
south and east, which still included a large segment of the 
population opposed to Ukrainian statehood and all 
reforms. In contrast, the Moscow Patriarchate seemed to 
emerge strengthened, since the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs that the Kravchuk government had used to support 
the Kyiv Patriarchate was abolished and the church's allies 
in local administrations in the large areas of the south, 
east, and even the center could work to its advantage in 
turning over church buildings and registering
congregations now that Kyiv's support for the Kyiv 
Patriarchate had been removed. In popular belief, 
Kuchma's Russian wife Liudmila was portrayed as an 
ardent adherent of the Moscow Patriarchate.
In contrast, at a time when the state became 
antagonistic, the Kyiv Patriarchate faced a loss of 
parishes, largely in Galicia, to the UAOC (in 1994 the 
UAOC grew from 289 to 612 communities, while the KP 
decreased from 1932 to 1753). In 1995, religious affairs in 
Ukraine reached a boiling point. The death of Patriarch 
Volodymyr (Romaniuk) in a manner that many considered 
suspiciously convenient for Metropolitan Filaret was 
followed by a funeral that the Ukrainian state largely 
ignored. Metropolitan Filaret insisted on the right to bury 
the patriarch on the territory of the St. Sophia Cathedral, 
the mother church of Ukraine still held by the state as a 
museum, in part because of the contentious claimants to 
the cathedral. The funeral procession, escorted by some 
paramilitary units of the radical right but which also 
included deputies to the parliament, was brutally attacked 
by OMON police, events which came to be known as 
Black Tuesday (July 18, 1995). Up until this point, the 
entire transition to independence and the transfer of power 
in Ukraine had been peaceful (especially when viewed in 
conjunction with Yeltsin's attack on the Russian 
parliament). The bloodshed, therefore, had tremendous 
resonance in Ukraine, threatening Kuchma with loss of 
support in Ukrainian patriotic circles. While Metropolitan 
Filaret had transgressed the line of legality, he had 
positioned his church as a patriotic body and had delivered 
a firm message that the government's tilt toward the 
Moscow Patriarchate might be costly. He also positioned 
himself for assuming the post of patriarch in October, 
which was a difficult step in light of the government's 
antagonism to the metropolitan and the opposition by the 
former UAOC groups to this authoritarian church leader 
who was seen as tainted by his past as an exponent of the 
ROC. Government policies and reaction against Filaret's 
election continued to undermine the KP's structure as it 
declined to 1332 communities by the end of 1995 and the 
UAOC grew to 1209.23 * Nevertheless, the Kyiv 
Patriarchate showed that not only could it continue 
without government support, but it could also resist a 
hostile government.
The government found the alienation of the national 
democratic camp to be too costly, especially at a time
22 "7/10/94 Presidential Election Results in Ukraine," on 
www.brama,com/ua-gov/el-94pre.html.
23 On church affairs in this period, see, Serhii Plokhy, "Church, State,




when it needed its support for enacting a new Ukrainian 
constitution. It therefore moved toward a more even-
handed approach in church affairs in 1996. The adoption 
of the Ukrainian constitution mandating separation of 
church from state represented repudiation by the 
government of the Soviet legacy of interference in church 
affairs and the independent Ukrainian government's 
attempts to regulate Orthodox affairs by favoring one 
church over another. The government initially followed a 
policy of encouraging tolerance among the Orthodox 
groups, partially by encouraging a declaration by religious 
leaders on peaceful resolution of conflicts in 1997 and by 
issuing a statement, condemning Soviet persecution of 
churches and promising the return of religious institutions 
before the 1999 presidential elections. Property 
controversies, especially over the holy sites in Kyiv, 
continued to be heated and to try the policy of even- 
handedness. The shift of the government to a more neutral 
position was also motivated by the decision of the UOC- 
MP in 1996 to withdraw the request to the Moscow 
Patriarchate for autocephaly made in 1991. This decision 
placed the Ukrainian government in the awkward position 
of seeing no end to the division and turmoil among 
Orthodox believers. In many circles the rejection of 
autocephaly as a goal was seen as reluctance by some in 
the UOC-MP and of the Moscow Patriarchate to accept 
Ukraine as an independent country or to desist from 
pressure for a new Slavic union. Certainly the existence of 
factions within the UOC-MP—in which Metropolitan 
Agafangel of Odesa, an ethnic Russian, played a major 
role—that denied even the existence of a Ukrainian nation 
and culture and organized Russian nationalist groups 
caused concern to the Ukrainian state.24 The ardent 
advocacy by the Communist Party of Ukraine for the 
UOC-MP, including by its head Petro Symonenko, 
Kuchma's opponent in the run-off election for the 
presidency in 1999, also drove a wedge between the 
presidential administration and the UOC-MP. The 
anathemization of Patriarch Filaret by the Moscow synod 
in 1997 undermined the government's policy of building 
tolerance, and excesses such as the physical attacks by 
followers of the Moscow Patriarchate when Patriarch 
Filaret visited Donetsk oblast on April 30, 1999, placed 
the UOC-MP on the wrong side of the issue of public 
order and blunted its charges that during the Kravchuk 
years the Kyiv Patriarchate had used force against it.25
24 See Isichenko,"Lektsiia 15. Pravoslavna Tserkva v nezalezhnii
Ukraini: 1991-2002," in his book Istoriia Khrystovoi tserkvy v Ukraini.
25 See Roman Woronowycz, "Patriarch Filaret attacked by faithful of
Above all, the increasing claims by the UOC-MP to 
preferential treatment by the government, similar to that 
which the Moscow Patriarchate received in Russia and 
Belarus, including even criticism of the president for 
attending Kyiv Patriarchate services in addition to 
Moscow Patriarchate services, placed the Ukrainian 
government in a difficult situation.26
By the late 1990s, the government found its policy of 
even-handedness was not calming the Orthodox divisions 
and returned to a more activist policy. The increasing 
interest of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in Ukrainian 
church affairs was signalled in part by its subordination of 
the Ukrainian Orthodox churches in the diaspora to its 
jurisdiction and its negotiation through them with the 
UAOC, which had not elected a new patriarch at the death 
of Patriarch Dmytrii in early 2000.27 Events such as the 
meeting of autocephalous and autonomous churches in 
Jerusalem, in which presidents and premiers of "Orthodox 
lands" were in attendance, placed the Ukrainian president 
and the state in an awkward position, since only the UOC- 
MP was represented, and not fully as a church but as part 
of the ROC.
Throughout 2000, the president made official 
announcements on the need for one Orthodox Church and 
supported unity talks between the UOC-KP and UAOC 
with participation of the Constantinople Patriarchate. The 
Ukrainian government's policy collided with the 
increasing intervention by the Moscow Patriarchate and 
the Russian government in Orthodox Church affairs in 
Ukraine. Not only did the Moscow Patriarchate refuse to 
grant a request for full autonomy from the UOC-MP in 
2000, but President Vladimir Putin and Patriarch Aleksei 
began to sound themes of East Slavic unity more 
consistently. The refusal of the UOC-MP to agree to a 
visit by Pope John Paul to Ukraine in 2001, which did 
take place despite this obstruction, and the statement of 
the Russian ambassador to Kyiv Viktor Chernomyrdin 
that the visit was ill-advised challenged the Ukrainian 
government and permitted Patriarch Filaret and the 
UAOC to point to their tolerant position toward other 
religious groups in contrast to the UOC-MP's
revival Church during visit to Mariupol," Ukrainian Weekly 67, no. 19 
(May 19, 1999).
26 See Plokhy, "Church, Nation, and State," 194.
27 For the situation in the UAOC, see Diiannia pomisnoho soboru 




intransigence.28 By the end of 2001, the Ukrainian 
government and the head of the State Committee for 
Religious Affairs, Viktor Bondarenko, were active 
participants in discussion between the Moscow and 
Constantinople patriarchates about the church situation in 
Ukraine, which were reported to center on the acceptance 
of two autonomous churches, the UOC-MP under the 
Moscow Patriarchate and the UAOC under the 
Constantinople Patriarchate. These discussions drew sharp 
criticism of the government by Patriarch Filaret as 
abandonment of the principle of autocephaly as well as an 
obvious attempt to undermine the UOC-KP.29 Though the 
government denied such a plan was its policy, the 
increasing strength of Russia in Ukrainian internal affairs 
under Putin and the weakened position of Kuchma after 
the Gongadze affair may explain this new tilt. The 
government was also complicit in undermining contacts of 
the UAOC with Constantinople through the intermediacy 
of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the 
United States. A combination of the government's desire 
to limit the influence of the Ukrainian hierarchy in the 
West and the plan of the Social Democratic Party of 
Ukraine (United) to use the church for its own political
goals resulted in a virtual coup d'etat in the church in early
2001 by Metropolitan Mefodii and a split in the UAOC.30
The parliamentary elections in the spring of 2002 in 
which the forces of the opposition did well ensured that 
unlike in Russia, where President Putin was asserting 
increasing control over civil society and the parliament, 
while allying with the Russian Orthodox Church, Ukraine 
would remain a more pluralistic society in which 
institutions such as the churches would have to be courted. 
The complexity of the situation was evident in that the two 
largest blocs of the opposition were Our Ukraine, which 
largely favored the independent Ukrainian Orthodox 
churches, and the Communist Party, the supporter of the 
Moscow Patriarchate. The degree to which politicians 
were now courting and even subverting churches was 
apparent in Metropolitan Mefodii's support of the Social
Democratic Party (United) in the elections and his later 
condemnation of the campaign for “Ukraine without 
Kuchma” in the fall.31 *
28 On the papal visit, see Gerd Stricker, "On a Delicate Mission: Pope 
John Paul II in Ukraine," Religion, State and Society 29, no. 3 
(2001):215-25.
29 See Jan Maksymiuk, "Kyiv Patriarch Warns against Liquidation of 
Independent Church," The Ukrainian Weekly (2 December 2001), 2.
30 See the "Khronolohichna tablytsia" at the end of Isichenko,"Lektsiia
15. Pravoslavna Tserkva v nezalezhnii Ukraini: 1991-2002," in his book
Istoriia Khrystovoi tserkvy v Ukraini.
31 See the "Khronolohichna tablytsia" at the end of Isichenko,"Lektsiia 
15. Pravoslavna Tserkva v nezalezhnii Ukraini: 1991-2002," in his book 




and the Orange Revolution
As Kuchma and his regime faced criminal allegations 
over the Gongadze affair and themselves became subject 
to opprobrium from much of the international community, 
government forces and allied oligarchs mounted an all-out 
campaign to stop Viktor Yushchenko and Our Ukraine 
from winning the presidential elections in the fall of 2004. 
After failing to carry out a political reform that would 
have shifted powers to the parliament, they concentrated 
on engineering the election of Premier Viktor 
Yanukovych as president. Determined to elect their 
candidate come what may, they increasingly undermined 
the democratic processes of Ukraine. Although elections 
and contending political groups were more significant in 
Ukraine than in Russia and Belarus, the decline of 
freedom of the press and increased pressure on all groups 
who challenged the government was dramatic. Still the 
undecided nature of the upcoming election and the 
significance of religious leaders as figures accorded trust 
ensured that political factions in Ukraine paid attention to 
the Orthodox churches and that the religious leaders 
addressed the issue of the upcoming elections.32 
Therefore, Patriarch Filaret's statement that concern for 
Ukrainian independence is intrinsic to the UOC-KP and 
that the believers of the church naturally support those 
politicians who support the church may be seen as staking 
out the church's stance in the election. Although it 
expressed the hope that Yanukovych would express such 
support, it commented on the support already 
demonstrated by Yushchenko. In contrast, the spokesman 
for the UOC-MP Archbishop Mitrofan declared that the 
church would not take part in political agitation, but 
pointed out the help that Viktor Yanukovych has rendered 
the church in Donetsk oblast. Meanwhile, statements 
issued by Patriarch Aleksii to a Slavic council held in 
Zaporizhzhia praising the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654 
made clear where he wanted his followers to stand on the 
Russia or Europe issue that underlay the Ukrainian 
election.33
Political advisers and spin doctors were well aware of 
how playing on the religious divides of the Orthodox
32 On the political and church leaders' statements, see "Tserkvi na starte 
prezidentskoi kampanii v Ukraine," in the internet journal Religiia i 
obshchestvo No. 39 (2004) (vloz@yandex.ru).
33 See the protest document (unpublished) by F.H. Turchenko, "Sobor 
iliuzii," disseminated after the events of May 17-19, 2004.
might influence the voters. A Russian advisers' plan from 
2003, when a run by Kuchma was still possible, surfaced 
that urged organizing provocations between followers of 
the Kyiv Patriarchate and Moscow Patriarchate in order to 
firm up support for Kuchma.34 After the decision was 
made by the presidential administration and its allies to 
coalesce around Yanukovych in the stop Yushchenko 
campaign, religious questions came increasingly to the 
fore in the search for wedge issues to build support for a 
candidate who had numerous personal drawbacks, 
including criminal convictions for violent crimes. 
Yanukovych increasingly posed as the candidate of the 
east and south of the country and a proponent of Russian 
as a state language and closer ties with Russia. All these 
issues resonated with much of the leadership of the UOC- 
MP and its constituency. Yanukovych had close relations 
with clergy in Donetsk oblast and used them to cast 
himself as the “Orthodox candidate” and to use the 
structures of the church in his political campaigns.35 The 
hierarchs of the UOC-MP and much of the clergy 
increasingly became advocates of the Yanukovych 
candidacy by passing out religious literature and holy 
pictures endorsing Yanukovych and agitating their faithful 
to support him.36 When Metropolitan Volodymyr of the 
UOC-MP met with Yanukovych, he blessed him as an 
Orthodox person worthy of heading the state, and when he 
later met with Yushchenko, who had been a patron of the 
UOC-MP, he blessed him but then announced that this 
was a different type, a personal blessing.37 Other hierarchs 
took an even more active role. The Metropolitan of 
Donetsk, Ilarion, called Yanukovych an Orthodox 
president and Yushchenko a servant of Satan.38
34 See "Tretii termin Kuchmy. Iak tse povinno bulo buty," in Ukrains'ka 
pravda, June 25, 2004 (www.pravda.com.ua).
35 On the piety of Yanukovych, see Tetiana Nikoaienko, "Chy 
molyvsia za Ianukovycha?" Ukrains'ka pravda, 11.11.2004, 21:15 
(http://www2.pravda.com.ua/archrve/2004/november/11/5.shtml
36 See Serhii Harmash, "Resprotektyva dvokh turiv vyboriv-2004 u 
Donbasi" http://www.maidan.org.ua/static/mai/1103719306.html for a 
discussion of the political agitation of priests in the Donbas and the 
distribution of images of the Archangel Michael and prayers for 
Yanukovych.
37 "Hlava UPTS(MP)'na prezidentstvo blahoslovyv v. Ianukovycha, a 
V. Iushchenka lyshe iak blahoslovliaie usikh viruiuchykh liudei',"
10.11.2004 RISU-UOC MP: Election 2004,
http;////www.risu.or.ua/ukr/news/hot theme/vybory2004/
38 "Metropolyt Donets'kyi UPTs(MP) nazvav V. Ianukovycha 
'pravoslavnym prezytentom', a V. Iushchenka-'sluhoiu satana',"
16.11.2004 RISU-UOC MP: Election 2004,
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Metropolitan Agafangel of Odesa actively agitated for 
voting for Yanukovych, while the bishop of Kirovhrad, 
Panteleimon, announced his apparitions of the Mother of 
God predicting a Yanukovych victory.39 In some cases, 
the hierarchy's pressure on the clergy to work for 
Yanukovych was so high that a priest in Chernihiv was 
dismissed for resisting.40 Priests broke the law not only by 
using religious institutions for political propaganda, but 
also by continuing political activity in the last days before 
the election when it was banned. Even after the second 
round of voting and the emergence of the Maidan 
protesting electoral fraud, monks of the Kyiv Caves 
Monastery organized processions against the pro- 
Yushchenko demonstrators. On December 27, 2004, after 
the Yushchenko victory in the election was certain, 
Patriarch Aleksii thanked Cossack formations in Ukraine 
for guarding Orthodox holy places, an action he saw as 
especially needed in view of the Yushchenko victory.41
The engagement of the UOC-MP on the Yanukovych 
side called forth negative reactions from its own faithful. 
In the west and center of Ukraine, where the majority of 
its parishes were located, anti-Yanukovych and pro- 
Yushchenko sentiments were very strong with all 
probability also among the faithful of the Moscow 
Patriarchate. The church in some cases antagonized its 
own faithful and in others compromised them before their 
fellow citizens.42 Groups of youth and clergy protested the 
political activity of their church. A group of clergy and 
laity went as far as asking that they be taken under the 
protection of the patriarch of Constantinople in order to be 
disassociated from the political activity of their church.43
http;////www.risu.or.ua/ukr/news/hot theme/vybory2004/
39 See, "UPTS(MP) v Odesi pidtrymuie V. Ianukovycha" 10.09.2004 
in RISU-UOC MP: Election 2004,
http;////www.risu.or.ua/ukr/news/hot theme/vybory2004/ and"Za 
Ianukovycha zmusyly ahituvaty Bozhu Matir," 22.12.2004. 
http://www.maidan.org.static.news/1103735196.html
40 See the interview with Protoierei Serhii Ivanenko-Kolenda, "Oni 
govoriat, im nel'zia risikovat', potomu chto u nikh est' dom..." 
http://maidan.org/static/mai/1103130442.html
41 "Russian Orthodox Patriarch Asks Cossack Army of Ukraine to 
Protect Church," http://www.risu.org.ua/eng/news/article;4215/
42 See Andrei Iurash, "Revoliutsiia i Tserkov'," Religiia i obshchestvo
43 (2004 internet version of the journal Liudyna i svit.
43 "Hrupa virnykh UPTS (MP) prosyt' Vselens'koho Patriarkha
vrehuliuvaty relihiinu sytuatsiiu v Ukraini," 29.12.2004 RISU-UOC 
MP: Election 2004, http;////www.risu.or.ua/ukr/news/hot 
theme/vybory2004/
With the triumph of the Orange Revolution, the 
position of the UOC-MP was extremely difficult, because 
it had engaged itself so actively against the new regime 
and had lost all claims to political neutrality. In contrast, 
the Kyiv Patriarchate had come through the electoral 
process more successfully. Obviously a Yanukovych 
government would have followed policies detrimental to 
the church, while a Yushchenko government could be 
expected to be at least neutral in church affairs and to 
follow a policy on national independence, relations with 
Russia, and Ukrainian language that would be in line with 
that of the UOC-KP. Although there had been some 
accusations against support for Yushchenko in parishes of 
the UOC-KP, the hierarchy and clergy on the UOC-KP 
had been much more muted in showing any political 
support that those of the UOC-MP had been, not least 
because a Yanukovych victory seemed likely and the 
political authorities in most regions initially supported 
Yanukovych. Therefore Patriarch Filaret had joined other 
confessions in Ukraine in calling for fairness of the 
elections, and only after the fraudulent second round and 
massive demonstrations at the Maidan came to support 
Yushchenko as the duly elected president.44 The splintered 
UAOC had little political significance in the elections. The 
connection of Metropolitan Mefodii with the Social 
Democrat Party (United) placed the church in Western 
Ukraine on the side of Yanukovych, though the church 
had little impact in a region so pro-Yushchenko. The 
faction dominant in the East under Archbishop Ihor 
followed a policy similar to that of the Kyiv Patriarchate. 
In contrast to the Moscow patriarch who clearly favored 
Yanukovych, Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople 
had come out with two messages supporting democratic 
processes in Ukraine. In his second message that greeted 
Yushchenko with his electoral victory, the Patriarch 
offered his services in healing schisms among Orthodox 
believers in Ukraine.45
Orthodoxy was politicized and the churches, above all 
the Moscow Patriarchate, took part in electoral politics 
during the elections in late 2004 to a much greater degree 
than they had ever done before. Unquestionably 
Yanukovych gained considerable advantage from the
44 On Patriarch Filaret's statements in the early part of the elections 
and the position of the UAOC, see Kateryna Shchotkina, "Mandat 
nebesnyi," Dzerkalo tyzhnia, no. 37, 18-24 September 2004 and 
Oleksandr Sahan, "Tserkvy obyraiut' prezydenta," 18.10.2004. RISU- 
UOC MP: Election 2004, http;////www.risu.or.ua/ukr/news/hot 
theme/vybory2004/




support of the UOC-MP, and he and the new opposition in 
Ukraine will turn to the church again for support. 
Yushchenko benefited from the refusal of the UOC-KP 
and part of the UAOC to support the government 
candidate and their joining the protests for democracy and 
against fraud after the second round of the elections. 
Although Yushchenko consistently declared after the 
elections that the state should not determine religious 
issues, the new Ukrainian government has to face the 
reality that a major Orthodox church tied to a center in 
Russia had campaigned against it. On the other hand, the 
UOC-MP had to deal with the consequences of its 
political choices and loss, both among its constituency and 
in determining relations with the state.
How then have the Ukrainian state and church affected 
each other in the partial democratization process in 
Ukraine? Neutrality in Orthodox affairs is, in fact, an 
impossible goal for the Ukrainian central or regional 
governments as long as there are church buildings it 
controls or other public buildings that the churches seek to 
obtain. At the same time, the concept of Ukraine as an 
Orthodox land and the claims of three Orthodox churches 
(as well as of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church) to be 
guardians of the national patrimony make it impossible for 
any Ukrainian government to divorce itself from religious 
issues. In Russia the public role of the patriarch and the 
attendance of the president and members of the 
government at holiday services of the ROC are easily 
accepted as fitting. In Ukraine similar functionaries must 
carefully plot each step just as the state media must plan 
its broadcast of various services.
In addition, the history of granting autocephaly in 
predominantly Orthodox lands has involved state support 
and in the case of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox 
Church in 1924 was even orchestrated by a state in which 
the Orthodox were a minority. The importance of 
Orthodox allegiance to states that had emerged from the 
USSR was demonstrated by the Estonian state, which saw 
the revival of the pre-World War II autonomous Orthodox 
Church under Constantinople replacing the Soviet legacy 
of all Orthodox being under the Moscow Patriarchate as a 
matter of state sovereignty. Hence the contacts of the 
Kuchma government with Constantinople and the 
president's expressions of hopes for Orthodox unity were a 
form of state activism that has a considerable tradition. In 
general, the churches have argued against state 
intervention when it would oppose their interests, as the 
MP has demonstrated in its objections to the Ukrainian 
state's actions on autocephaly and unity issues. On the 
other hand, the Orthodox churches still make claims to 
special rights in an Orthodox land. The Ukrainian
Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has held up 
Russia as an example of what its own relations should be 
with the Ukrainian state.46
How then has Orthodoxy influenced the political 
transformation in Ukraine? Although the Orthodox leaders 
conceive of Ukraine as an Orthodox land and the 
Orthodox hierarchs are given symbolic precedence by 
government officials, even in matters such as army 
chaplaincies, the Orthodox have not been able to assume 
the leading position that the church has in Russia, Georgia 
or Romania or that the Catholic church has in Poland. In 
part this situation results from the greater activity of non-
Orthodox Christian groups, especially the existence of a 
Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Galicia and 
Transcarpathia that also claims the mantel of a traditional 
national faith and because of the very active Protestant 
groups, missionizing in the south and east. Just as 
important has been the split among the Orthodox groups 
and their varied stance on political and national agendas, 
above all the ambivalence to hostility in some quarters of 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Moscow Patriarchate, to 
Ukrainian independence and Ukrainian language and 
culture (especially in the south and east).
As a result, the Orthodox have not been able to take an 
authoritative position in Ukraine commensurate with their 
large numbers and organizational network. This situation 
has strengthened religious pluralism in Ukrainian political 
life. On the other hand, the Orthodox churches have 
turned to political leaders and the political process in order 
to further their own jurisdictions' interests, thereby 
deepening cleavages among Ukrainian political groups 
and interjecting church affairs into the political process. 
This process has not resulted in the formation of 
significant religious parties in Ukraine, but it has 
identified religious allegiance with certain political 
orientations. Given that the parties and churches already 
have linguistic-cultural and regional colorings, the 
religious factor only increases the divides in a fractious 
Ukrainian political life. The progressive distribution of 
church buildings somewhat lessens the political jockeying 
of the church groups, but complaints continue over 
whether the distribution has occurred in an equitable 
manner and the continued control by government of 
edifices that could be used for churches, especially in the 
south and east where surviving church buildings are few, 
keeps the pot boiling. As the central administrations of the
46 See the Itar Tass article of April 9, 2004 "Some Ukraine Politicians 
Create Difficulties for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church," reproduced on 
UR-2004, #58 April 12.
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Orthodox churches and the parishes control great revenues 
and property and economic rights they also have reason to 
maintain political and administrative allies and political 
alliances.
The breakdown of the Soviet system and the 
establishment of a semi-democratic system in Ukraine 
with multi-foci of power and elements of civil society has 
permitted the breakdown of the enforced unity of 
Orthodox believers and the surfacing of contending 
Orthodox traditions. Just as the state had to deal with the 
Soviet legacy, the Russian Orthodox Church had to deal 
with these traditions as well as the reemergence of the 
early twentieth-century questions of Ukrainian 
autocephaly, Ukrainianization, and conciliarism. The 
radically divergent views that Orthodox clergy and laity 
held on these questions and the fact that they had surfaced 
and been debated before and had been kept alive by the 
religious institutions of the Ukrainian diaspora meant that 
positions were staked out and the church split even before 
Ukrainian independence. For the UAOC and the UOC-KP 
this has left the primary question recognition by the 
Orthodox Oecumene, apparently advanced somewhat in 
the last few years through contacts with the 
Constantinople Patriarchate, as well as the question of 
unity, despite the differing modes of church governance in 
the UAOC and the UOC-KP. In contrast, the UOC-MP 
still finds these questions unresolved as well as the attitude 
of the church on Ukraine's political status and orientation 
and on national-cultural issues. In many ways, the 
defection of the UAOC and UOC-KP and of the many 
believers who went over to the UGCC has diminished the 
group within the UOC-MP that advocates autocephaly and 
Ukrainization. The losses have in some ways made the 
church suspicious of any discussion and more dependent 
on the Moscow Patriarchate (hence the withdrawal of the 
autocephaly request), though the various regional and 
national constituencies of the UOC-MP ensure that 
differing views are held within the church.
In no country that emerged from the former Soviet 
bloc did the state and Orthodox church face so many 
explosive and divisive issues as in Ukraine. The learning 
process for the government and the religious leaders has 
been a difficult one. The adoption of Western models, in 
particular American ones, was impossible, given the 
Soviet legacy and the Orthodox tradition. Even today the 
state does not view the division of the Orthodox as 
conducive to social order and the tendency to see 
autocephaly as an attribute of an independent country is 
strong, in part because those who wish a renewed Slavic 
union reject it. Political, linguistic and cultural groups 
have all turned to the Orthodox churches as institutional
sources of support or an arena for propagating their 
agenda. Though the three churches have defined 
constituencies, groups from Russian nationalist to 
Ukrainian autocephalists in the UOC-MP create opposing 
pressures. Yet in the last decade the state and Orthodox 
churches have dealt with a limited democratization and the 
development of contending political groups. The issues of 
state- and nation-building have intertwined with Orthodox 
affairs in forming independent Ukraine. The new 
government in Ukraine will have to deal with a situation 
in which the Orthodox issue has moved to the fore in 
political life just as the question of the situation of 
Orthodoxy in Ukraine has assumed a higher profile in 
international Orthodox circles. Whether a stable, more 
democratic Ukraine will emerge from the Orange 
Revolution is still uncertain. What is certain is that a more 
democratic Ukraine would pose new opportunities and 
challenges for the Orthodox churches.
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